Parasite is best seen in existential rather than moral terms. It does not issue in moral, social or economic judgements. The film describes, or perhaps portrays, the dreamlike mode of fantasy “existence” the “underground” people in a society so rigidly stratified that communication with people on the other side of the societal “lines” is literally impossible, inevitably resulting in the destruction, real or metaphorical, of everyone on both sides of those lines.

One of Marx‘s and Engels‘ main claims (hereafter ―original Marxism) in their account of the historical ―inevitability of the collapse of capitalism is that one‘s material (economic) conditions, not one‘s ideas, arguments or philosophy, determines one‘s ―consciousness and actions. However, the self-reference in this characterization of philosophical views generates a paradox analogous to the 7th century B.C. Epimenides ―Liar paradox. The Epimenides-paradox arises when Epimenides, a Cretan, states that all Cretans are liars. Epimenides-statement is paradoxical in the sense that if (...) it is true then it is false. Similarly, the Marxist claim that all philosophers who purport to state the cause of all social changes must be wrong, where Marx and Engels are themselves philosophers stating just such a claim, generates a paradox analogous to the ― Epimenides Liar paradox. This leads to what Engels himself calls a―false consciousness, i.e., a failure to understand the true causes of social change. This paradox can only be escaped by abandoning at least one of original Marxism‘s core doctrines. (shrink)

§ I presents a detailed version of “Popper’s Basic Argument.” § 2 shows why Marx’s theory of historical development is a paradigm case of the kind of “historicism” that is refuted by Popper’s argument. § 3 explains the crucial difference between Marx’s and Spengler’s respective theories that makes the former but not the latter fall to Popper’s criticism. § 4 argues that the inapplicability of Popper’s argument to Spengler’s type of theory is obvious from the beginning.

This paper discusses Wittgenstein’s striking remark at para. 608 of Zettel, hereafter Z608, which, according to most commentators, suggests that the order of language and thought might arise out of physical chaos or nothingness at the neural center of normal language users. In opposition to this orthodox interpretation, the present paper argues that Z608, following Spengler, who is himself influenced by Goethe and Nietzsche, is actually suggesting that the order in language and thought might arise out of the creative chaos (...) at what Spengler sees as the true center of human life, namely, human history. (shrink)

§ I describes Heidegger’s account of authenticity in BT. § II describes Spengler’s account of Dasein as the being of plants.4 § III argues that Heidegger holds that authentic Dasein is rooted in a Volk as a plant is rooted in its soil. § IV shows that Heidegger’s post-Being and Time authenticity consists in embracing the plant-like dream, expressed in “primordial poetry,” of one’s Volk. § V replies to a textual objection.

Biographical account of Thomas Merton who was one of the leading Christian spiritual leaders of the 20th century. He authored more than 60 books and many reviews and essays primarily on spirituality, social justice and pacifism. His autobiographical account of his spiritual journey in The Seven Story Mountain proved immensely inspirational to many and is listed as one of the 100 best non-fiction books of the 20th century by the National Review. In later life, Merton engaged in dialogue with major (...) Eastern spiritual figures like the Dali Lama, Thai Buddhist monk Buddhadasa, Vietnamese monk Thich Nhat Hanh and Japanese writer D.T. Suzuki. Merton wrote books on Zen Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism at a time when this was not common among Christian theologians. -/- ​. (shrink)

Scholars have often struggled with the notion of mysticism in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus-logico-philosophicus (TLP). The paper develops a taxonomy of the multiple species of mysticism in TLP in order to show that its notion of the mystical actually has a complex hierarchial structure. A key notion in TLP’s account is its neglected notion of the “life-world” (5.621), specifically, that realm in which the “mystical” “shows itself [zeigt sich]”. A comparison is made with Heidegger’s notion in Being and Time of the fundamental (...) phenomena of phenomenology as that that sort of phenomena that “shows itself [sich zeit].” That is, TLP’s notion of the mystical is at the same time a sketch the phenomenological structure of the “life-world”. On this basis it is argued that TLP’s account of linguistic meaning is parasitic on its notion of the “mystical” dimension of the “life-world”, which has the consequence that one cannot separate the “safe” logical and scientific portion of TLP from its mysticism as Russell and the logical positivists tried to do. The “mysticism” and “phenomenology” must stay. Finally, the paper argues that TLP is not, as often thought, a proponent of Russell’s method of analysis into “logical atoms” but actually presents a powerful critique of the analytical method. (shrink)

Dennis C. Rasmussen has produced an excellent account of “the greatest of all philosophical friendships” between two of the great thinkers of the underappreciated “Scottish Enlightenment”, Adam Smith, Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, and, in his The Wealth of Nations, often seen as the founder of capitalism and creator of the modern science of economics, and David Hume, who never became an academic but who took “British Empiricism” to its logical sceptical conclusion and is often seen (...) as the most influential philosopher ever to write in the English language. -/- The book covers the span between Smith’s and Hume’s first meeting in 1749 until Smith’s eulogy upon Hume’s death in 1776. It describes how they commented on each other’s work, supported each other’s careers and literary ambitions and advised each other on personal issues. They had many of the same friends, joined the same clubs, and were interested in many of the same subjects beyond philosophy, including psychology, history, politics and Britain’s conflict with the American colonies. -/- Each chapter focuses on an historical episode and theme, beginning with an introduction to Hume and his works (Chap. 1), Smith’s discovery of Hume’s writings and acquaintance with Hume (Chap. 2), their developing friendship (Chap. 3), Hume’s conflict with the Church of Scotland (Chap. 4), Smith’s work on The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Chap. 5), Hume’s fruitful sojourn in France (Chap. 6), Hume’s friendship and eventual conflict with the moody paranoid Swiss philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Chap. 7), the last years of Hume’s and Smith’s friendship (Chap. 8), Smith’s publication of An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Chap. 9), the dispute over Smith’s reluctance to publish Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Chap. 10), Hume’s final days (Chap. 11), Smith’s Eulogy to Hume (Chap. 12), and Smith’s final years in Edinburgh (Epilogue). (shrink)